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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______
No. 11-4441
______
ADVANCE CAPITAL PARNTERS, LLC, AND LIZA PRICE,
v.
BELA ROSSMANN
Appellant
______
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 2:09-cv-03467)
District Court Judge: Honorable Thomas J. Rueter, Magistrate Judge
______
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 11, 2012
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 12, 2012)

______
OPINION OF THE COURT
______
GARTH, Circuit Judge.
Bela Rossmann appeals from the judgment of the District Court awarding
compensatory damages to Advance Capital Partners, LLC, and Liza Price for claims of
fraudulent concealment and negligent misrepresentation arising from Rossmann’s efforts

to finance a real estate purchase. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For
the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I
We write principally for the benefit of the parties and recite only the facts essential
to our disposition.
In order to purchase a parcel of land for subsequent resale and development,
Rossmann arranged for a loan in excess of three million dollars from National Penn
Bank, conditioned on his posting approximately nine hundred thousand dollars in
collateral and interest reserve accounts. In order to raise money to meet these conditions,
Rossmann in turn sought a second loan of 1.1 million dollars. Rossmann approached an
acquaintance, Liza Price, to obtain information regarding potential investors. Price in turn
introduced Rossmann to Peter Cocoziello, the CEO of Advance Capital Partners, LLC
(ACP). Over the course of a brief meeting, a tour of the property, and a lunch meeting,
Rossmann provided Cocoziello and Price with a brochure for the proposed development
as well as rough engineering and architectural plans. The three also discussed the terms
of the proposed loan, which was to be secured in part by a pledge of stock in the
corporate entity created by Rossmann to hold title to the property. Rossmann, who
wished to close the sale quickly in order to execute an anticipated resale of a portion of
the land and was desperate to obtain financing because his own investment in the
property would otherwise be lost, did not inform Cocoziello and Price that the terms of
sale of the property obligated Rossmann to pay the seller of the land one hundred

2

thousand dollars upon the subsequent resale of the property, nor did Rossmann provide a
copy of the addendum to the principal sale agreement that contained this provision.
Following the lunch meeting, Cocoziello requested that Rossmann forward all
relevant documents to Thomas Dillon, a consultant retained by ACP, for review. In
addition to relying on this consultant to perform the necessary due diligence, Cocoziello
also relied on the decision of National Penn Bank to issue the principal loan in deciding
whether to lend to Rossmann. Price performed no independent investigation, but rather
relied on the diligence of the other lenders.
ACP and Price agreed to provide the requested financing, and Rossmann
proceeded to purchase the parcel of land. Approximately two years later, Rossmann,
having failed to sell the property, defaulted on the National Penn Bank loan. This default
in turn entitled ACP and Price to take control of the corporate entity that held the land,
which they did. ACP and Price subsequently failed to cure the default on the National
Penn loan, and National Penn foreclosed on the property. ACP in turn purchased the
property at a foreclosure sale.
ACP and Price then brought an action against Rossmann, asserting claims of
breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent
inducement, fraudulent concealment, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent
misrepresentation. Following a bench trial, conducted by agreement before a Magistrate
Judge, the court found for ACP and Price on their fraudulent concealment and negligent
misrepresentation claims, both of which concerned Rossmann’s alleged failure to
disclose the obligation to pay the additional $ 100,000 to the seller of the property upon
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resale of the land. The court awarded ACP $ 64,000 and Price $ 36,000 in compensatory
damages. Rossmann timely appealed.
II
We begin by considering Rossmann’s challenge to the District Court’s negligent
misrepresentation finding. Under Pennsylvania law, “[n]egligent misrepresentation
requires proof of: (1) a misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) made under
circumstances in which the misrepresenter ought to have known its falsity; (3) with an
intent to induce another to act on it; and; [sic] (4) which results in injury to a party acting
in justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation.” Bortz v. Noon, 556 Pa. 489, 500, 729
A.2d 555, 561 (1999). The question of “[w]hether any particular representation . . . was
false or misleading is a question of fact subject to review under the clearly erroneous
standard. . . . Under the clearly erroneous standard, a finding of fact may be reversed on
appeal only if it is completely devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or bears no rational
relationship to the supporting data.” Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d
212, 229-230 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Questions concerning the
parties’ knowledge, mental states, and reliance likewise are factual determinations subject
to review for clear error. Id. at 229.
Rossmann asserts that the evidence presented at trial failed to show by a
preponderance of evidence that he failed to disclose that additional money would be
owed to the seller of the land following resale of the land. He further contends that
Cocoziello’s and Price’s reliance on such a failure, if it did occur, was not justifiable
because Cocoziello and Price were sophisticated investors who unreasonably chose not to
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conduct a further investigation. Rossmann does not contest the court’s findings that the
nondisclosure, if it occurred, was a material misrepresentation, 1 that he ought to have
known the nondisclosure was a misrepresentation, or that he intended to—and in fact
did—induce reliance through such nondisclosure.
With respect to whether the evidence supports a finding of nondisclosure, it is
undisputed that at no point did Rossmann affirmatively state to Cocoziello and Price that
money would be owed to the seller upon resale of the land. Testimony provided by Price,
Cocoziello, and Dillon, moreover, indicated that Rossmann never supplied the sales
agreement addendum that contained this obligation. Although Rossmann disputes this
testimony and claims to have provided the document, the trier of fact’s decision to credit
the testimony of Price, Cocoziello, and Dillon is, in the absence of contrary extrinsic
evidence or internal contradiction, entitled to considerable deference. Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985).
Although Price, Cocoziello, and Dillon all exhibited some imprecision in their respective
memories of the relevant events, they testified consistently, and their testimony that

1

The parties appear to assume that a failure to disclose may, as a general matter,
unproblematically qualify as a misrepresentation for purposes of a negligent
misrepresentation claim. We note, however, that several district court opinions, relying
on an opinion by the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, have held that under
Pennsylvania law a negligent misrepresentation claim may not be made out on the basis
of a failure to disclose. See, e.g., Lazin v. Pavilion Partners, CIV. A. 95-601, 1995 WL
614018 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 1995) (“Non-disclosure of a material fact would give rise to a
cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure, not for negligent misrepresentation.”),
citing Lang v. Helios Capital Corp., 86-08031, 1989 WL 299241 (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 20,
1989) (“non-disclosure would give rise to a cause of action only for fraudulent nondisclosure, and not for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.”). As Rossmann has not
raised this issue, we treat it as waived and do not address it.
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Rossmann never provided the addendum to the sales agreement is not controverted by
other evidence. The Magistrate Judge therefore properly found that Rossman failed to
disclose the addendum to the sales agreement.
Regarding the justifiability of Cocoziello’s and Price’s reliance on Rossmann’s
misrepresentation through nondisclosure, ACP and Price assert that Rossmann has raised
this issue for the first time on appeal and that we therefore should not review it.
Rossmann does not challenge this assertion in his reply brief. “As a general rule we do
not review issues raised for the first time at the appellate level. Although we have the
discretion to review an argument not raised below, we will ordinarily refuse to do so.”
Gardiner v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., 145 F.3d 635, 646-47 (3d Cir. 1998)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As Rossmann has provided no reason to
depart from the general policy of not reviewing unpreserved arguments, and no such
reason is readily apparent, we decline to review this aspect of Rossmann’s claim on
appeal.
Moreover, even if we were to reach the merits of this claim, Rossmann would not
be entitled to prevail on this ground. In the proceedings below, ACP and Price presented
expert evidence opining that reliance on Rossmann’s representations was reasonable in
light of the very short time window available to the parties to conduct the transaction.
Rossmann did not meaningfully challenge this testimony on cross examination, nor did
he offer any evidence in rebuttal. In presenting proposed findings of fact and law to the
trial court, Rossmann made no proposals concerning lack of justifiable reliance. The
Magistrate Judge was thus entitled to credit the uncontroverted testimony regarding the
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reasonableness of Cocoziello’s and Price’s reliance on Rossmann under the
circumstances of the transaction in this case.
We therefore conclude that the Magistrate Judge properly found for ACP and
Price on their negligent misrepresentation claim. As the Magistrate Judge determined,
and Rossmann does not dispute on appeal, a prevailing plaintiff in both negligent
misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment actions is entitled to recovery for the loss
caused by the concealment or misrepresentation. See Peters v. Stroudsburg Trust Co., 348
Pa. 451, 453, 35 A.2d 341, 343 (1944); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552B (1977).
Because identical damages are available under each theory on which Rossmann was
found liable and both claims arose from the same failure to disclose, the damages award
may be sustained on the basis of the negligent misrepresentation finding standing alone. 2
III
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 3

2

We therefore need not consider whether the Magistrate Judge properly found for ACP
and Price on the fraudulent concealment claim as well. See CIBA-GEIGY Corp. v. Bolar
Pharm. Co., Inc., 719 F.2d 56, 57 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983).
3
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 30, “Appendix to the Briefs” provides, inter alia,
that “the relevant portions of the pleadings” must be included in the appendix. The
complaint, which is essential to the resolution of this appeal, was not included in the
appendix. It is unacceptable that counsel is not familiar with and did not comply with the
basic rules of appellate procedure.
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